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Teaching and Researching Comparative
Subnational Constitutional Law
Robert F. Williams*
I.

INTRODUCTION

I had the opportunity to teach "Comparative Subnational
Constitutional Law" as a five-week seminar in Graz, Austria in MayJune of 2009. I admit that I have not yet sought to develop, or even
apply, any of the theories being debated in comparative constitutional
law circles. Professor Vicki Jackson has suggested four goals of
comparative constitutional study: 1) developing a better intellectual
understanding of other systems; 2) enhancing the capacity for selfreflection on one's own system; 3) developing a normative
understanding of best practices; and 4) responding to domestic questions
that are comparative in nature.' All of these seem to apply equally to
* Distinguished Professor of Law, Associate Director, Center for State
Constitutional Studies, www.camlaw.rutgers.edu/statecon/. I dedicate this article to my
colleagues and students at the University of Graz, Austria. Their law faculty and Rutgers
Law School in Camden, New Jersey, have had a faculty exchange program now for over
twenty-five years. I express particular thanks to Professor Erwin Bernat, who administers
our faculty exchange and to Alexander Brenneis, now a Research Associate at the
University of Graz who, as a visiting student at Rutgers, took my course on State
Constitutional Law and then served as my Teaching Assistant back in Graz.
1. See Vicki C. Jackson, Methodological Challenges in Comparative Constitutional
Law, 28 PENN. ST. INT'L L. REV. 319 (2010). Ran Hirschl criticized comparative
constitutional law scholarship because it is "under-theorized and lacks a coherent
Ran Hirschl, The Question of Case Selection in Comparative
methodology."
ConstitutionalLaw, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 125, 125 (2005). If that is true for comparative
constitutional law it must be an even more accurate description of comparative
subnationalconstitutional law. Hirschl continued:
I begin by identifying four main types of scholarship labeled as comparative in
the field of constitutional law and politics: (1) freestanding, single-country
studies mistakenly characterized as comparative only by virtue of dealing with
any country other than the author's own; (2) comparative reference aimed at
self-reflection through analogy, distinction, and contrast; (3) comparative
research aimed at generating "thick" concepts and thinking tools through multifaceted descriptions; and (4) studies that draw upon controlled comparison and
inference-oriented case selection principles in order to assess change, explain
dynamics, and make inferences about cause and effect through systematic case
selection and analysis of data. While the study of comparative constitutional
law by legal academics has contributed significantly to concept formation and
the accumulation of knowledge drawing upon the former three categories of
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comparative subnational constitutional law. Believing that there were
enough materials now in English (my only language) to put together a set
of readings for such a seminar, I gathered up a number of the
publications that I have listed in the bibliography at the end of this
article. I made these materials available to the students who had
registered to take this course in English and found that most of the
Austrian law students, like most American law students in the prior
generation, were basically unaware of the, albeit relatively limited, legal
importance and potential of the subnational constitutions in their country.
In fact, in Austria the constitutions of the Ldnder have not been
considered very important, nor is the subnational constitutional space
allotted by the Austrian Constitution particularly substantial.2 In other
words, the Austrian Constitution is more "complete" than many other
federal constitutions, in that it specifies a number of the structural
elements of the component unit governments within the national
constitution itself.3 Consequently, the subnational constitutional space is
not very extensive. Still, however, the Lander constitutions in Austria
have important (potential or possible) legal and political roles, and I
thought it would be important to begin with an introduction to those
matters. 4 Rather than comparisons with the state constitutions in the
United States, I concluded that a comparative class might be more
meaningful if we started with the subnational constitutions of the host
country. Discussing the potential of subnational constitutions can be
very interesting, as I have discovered in Austria, South Africa,5 Brazil,
Mexico and Argentina. Analyzing at least some of the preliminary
questions quoted below in the context of the subnational constitutions of
the host country can lay an effective groundwork or baseline for a
selective consideration on some or all of these questions vis-1-vis the
subnational constitutions in other countries.

comparative analysis, it has, for the most part, fallen short of advancing
knowledge through inference-oriented, controlled comparison.
Id. at 125-26. But see infra note 81.
2. For example, a leading book on the Austrian legal system seems not even to
mention the constitutions of the Ldnder. See HERBERT HAUSMANINGER, THE AUSTRIAN
LEGAL SYSTEM (3d ed. 2003).
3. See infra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
4. Peter Bussjlger, ConstitutionalAutonomy Versus Centralizing Powers: The
Case ofAustria, in MICHAEL BURGESS & G. ALAN TARR, CONSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS IN
FEDERAL SYSTEMS: SUB-NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (forthcoming 2011).
5. I participated in an extremely interesting discussion with Professor Nico
Steytler's LL.M. students at the University of the Western Cape in Cape Town, South
Africa, in 2009, concerning the potential of the provincial constitutions in that country.
See also infra notes 52-53, 61-62 and accompanying text.
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BACKGROUND STUDY OF SUBNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS

Many years ago I wrote an article called State ConstitutionalLaw:
Teaching and Scholarship.6 I have continued my work since then with
American state constitutional law, which is a form of comparative
constitutional law.7 In addition, together with my Rutgers political
science colleague, and Director of the Center for State Constitutional
Studies, Dr. G. Alan Tarr, we have initiated a study of "subnational"
constitutions in other countries that are organized on the basis of
constitutional federalism. This investigation began with a tentative,
nonexhaustive set of questions that could be asked about the
constitutions of component units in federal countries as a basis for
comparative evaluation:
First, what is the theoretical function of subnational constitutions?
Do they limit residual governmental power, or grant enumerated
powers? Are there records of the debates on adoption, amendment,
and revision of such constitutions? Is there anything in the national
constitution that mandates certain provisions or matters be contained
in the state constitutions? What is the role of popular sovereignty or
constituent power in the process of adopting, amending, and revising
the subnational constitution, and does constituent power (initiative,
referendum, approval of borrowing, etc.) come into play in the
operation of governmental systems under the subnational
constitutions?
Second, how similar are the subnational constitutions to each other?
Is there evidence that provisions in some constitutions have been
modeled from others, either within the country or from outside?
What have been the processes of evolution of subnational
constitutions over the years, both within the subnational polity and,
more generally, within each federal system? Are governmental
institutions, rights protections, distribution of powers, and other
matters different from or similar to those contained in the national
constitution? Is there a standard set of matters and issues-a
checklist-that should be dealt with in any subnational constitution?

6. Robert F. Williams, State ConstitutionalLaw: Teaching and Scholarship, 41 J.
LEG. ED. 243 (1991). See also Jeffrey S. Sutton, Brennan Lecture: Why Teach-And
Why Study-State ConstitutionalLaw, 34 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV, 165 (2009); Michael E.
Libonati, State Constitutions and Legislative Process: The Road Not Taken, 89 B.U. L.
REV. 863 (2009).
7. ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS (2009)
[hereinafter AMERICAN STATE CONSTITTIONS]; ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (4th ed. 2006); FRANK P. GRAD & ROBERT
F. WILLIAMS, 2 STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: DRAFTING
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, REVISIONS, AND AMENDMENTS (2006).
8. G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS (1998).
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Which governmental institutions provide authoritative interpretation
of the subnational constitutions? Is there a subnational judiciary that
interprets the subnational constitution, and, if so, can such
interpretations be reviewed by the national judiciary? Were there
important proposals put forward during consideration of subnational
constitutions that were not adopted and, if so, were they adopted
later?
Third, what are the politics of subnational constitutional change? Is
the constitution frequently amended or revised, as a normal part of
the component unit's politics, or are constitutional politics outside the
scope of "normal politics"?
Fourth, how have the federal system's origins as integrative (leaving
subnational constitutional space) or as devolutionary (creating
subnational constitutional space) affected such issues as whether the
component units' constitutions primarily limit or grant power? Have
preexisting subnational constitutions served as models or provided
experience for drafting the national constitution or for other, more
recently admitted or created component units? 9
We contend that a careful study of the subnational constitutions of
component unitso must proceed, first, from a top-down (or centerperiphery) view to determine the quantity and quality of "subnational
constitutional space" permitted by the national constitution to the
component units." This would involve a determination of legal or de
jure questions concerning the competency of component units to enact
their own constitutions. We suggest that this space would be either
wider or narrower depending on the range of discretion the national
constitution provided for component units to adopt their own
constitutions. Alan Tarr has provided a perceptive review of the factors
that may contribute to either a wider or narrower subnational
9. Robert F. Williams & G. Alan Tarr, Subnational ConstitutionalSpace: A View
From the States, Provinces, Regions, Ldnder, and Cantons, in FEDERALISM,
SUBNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS, AND MINORITY RIGHTS 3, 13-14 (G. Alan Tarr, Robert F.

Williams & Josef Marko eds., 2004).
10. More than a dozen countries organized on the basis of constitutional federalism
Robert F. Williams, Comparative Subnational
utilize subnational constitutions.
ConstitutionalLaw: South Africa's Provincial ConstitutionalExperiments, 40 S. TEx. L.
REv. 625, 630 (1999).
11. Williams & Tarr, supra note 9, at 4-5. On the question of whether the Australian
state constitutions are authorized, or merely recognized and continued, by the federal
constitution, see ANNE TWOMEY, THE CONSTITUTION OF NEW SOUTH WALES 797-801
(2004). For a survey of recent top-down changes in federal countries, see Nathalie
Behnke & Arthur Benz, The Politics of Constitutional Change Between Reform and
Evolution, 39 PUBLIUS 213 (Spring 2009). See also Richard Simeon, Constitutional
Design and Change in Federal Systems: Issues and Questions, 39 PUBLIUS 241 (Spring
2009).
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constitutional space within a federal country.12
Subnational constitutional space might also be accordion-like,
expanding and contracting over the years through changes to the national
constitution or judicial interpretation of it. For example, in Austria, the
national constitution was amended in 1999 to permit Ldnder
constitutions to include audit offices which could examine financial
management of Land governments, after substantial doubt was expressed
over whether such institutions exceeded the allotted subnational
constitutional space.' 3 Countries like the United States and Germany
provide a fairly wide space in which component units may exercise
competency to adopt their own constitutions (their national constitutions
are less "complete"). 14 Countries like Mexico, South Africa and Austria,
on the other hand, provide only a relatively narrow range of such
subnational constitutional competency (their national constitutions are
more "complete"). India, except for the special case of the Muslimmajority state of Jammu and Kashmir, does not permit any state
constitutional space because all of the structural and other elements of
state competency are contained in the national constitution itself.'5
Canada does not have formal, written provincial constitutions.16
12. G. Alan Tarr, Explaining Sub-national Constitutional Space, 115 PENN. ST. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2011).
13. Bussjager, supranote 4.
14. Donald Lutz, The United States Constitutionas an Incomplete Text, 496 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCIENCE 23, 32 (Mar. 1988):
The Constitution is incomplete because a significant number of questions we
can bring to it are not answerable using the one document alone. The general
question of what the Founders intended, depending upon the specific topic,
almost always takes us beyond the national Constitution for resolution. The
prominence of states in 42 separate sections of the Constitution is one reason.
Another is that the term "Founders," given the relationship of the Constitution
to the state constitutions, Declaration of Independence, and Articles of
Confederation, must include far more than those who attended the Philadelphia
convention in 1787.
15. Akhtar Majeed, Republic of India, in CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS, STRUCTURE,
AND CHANGE IN FEDERAL COUNTRIES 180, 188 (John Kincaid & G. Alan Tarr eds., 2005);
Arshi Khan, Federalism and Nonterritorial Minorities in India, in FEDERALISM,
SUBNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS, AND MINORITY RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 199, 201. See
also HARIHAR BHATTACHARYYA, FEDERALISM IN ASIA: INDIA, PAKISTAN AND MALAYSIA
28 (2010) ("Although it is the only State in the Indian Federation to have a Constitution
of its own, its Constitution is governed by Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, which
does not allow it to establish a theocracy.").
16. G. Alan Tarr, Subnational Constitutions and Minority Rights: A Perspective on
CanadianProvincial Constitutionalism,40 RUTGERS L.J. 767, 770 (2009). See also id. at
783-84:
Bill 196, introduced in the Quebec National Assembly in 2007 .
acknowledges the identity of Quebecers as a French-speaking nation and
affirms that "it is the prerogative of the Qudbec nation to express its identity
through the adoption of a Qudbec Constitution."
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Federal countries bracket their subnational constitutional space in
different ways.
Subnational constitutional space may have both
substantive and procedural elements. In other words, the national
constitution may not only specify the areas in which the component units
may exercise their constitutionmaking competency and discretion, but
also mandate the processes by which that discretion is exercised.
In addition, of course, these matters may be dealt with in the
national constitution in either a symmetrical or an asymmetrical manner.
Some federal countries, in contrast to the United States, treat their
component units differently with respect to their substantive and
procedural subnational constitutional space. Interestingly, Franchesio
Palermo contends that asymmetry has been increasing in Federal
countries.1 7 On the other hand, James Gardner and Antoni Abad i Ninet,
based on Madisonian views, argue that for an effective federalism where
the component units can resist federal power, asymmetry encourages
competition among component units rather than between the component
units in common competition with the federal government.18
We suggest that these questions concerning subnational
constitutional space are legal in nature, and require a method of federal
policing to ensure that the subnational constitutional space is not
exceeded by the component units, on the one hand, nor is it invaded by
national authorities on the other hand. 19
Next, however, we opined that if one were to look at the subnational
constitutions themselves in a federal country, this would constitute a
bottom-up (or periphery-center) analysis. From this point of view, the
evaluation would not be a legal one, but rather an evaluation of the
political, de facto choices made by each subnational unit as to how and
to what extent to utilize its subnational constitutional space or
constitutionmaking competency. 20 From this perspective, in virtually all
of subnational
federal countries, a much wider variety
constitutionmaking, or asymmetry, would come into focus. One of our
early conclusions, however, was that many component units in federal
countries do not fully utilize (a political decision) the subnational
constitutional space allotted them as a matter of law under the national

17.

Francescso Palermo, Asymmetries in Constitutional Law-An Introduction, in

ASYMMETRIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN FEDERAL AND

REGIONAL SYSTEMS 11, 12-13 (Franchesco Palermo, Carolin Zwilling & Karl K6ssler,
eds., 2009).
18. James A. Gardner & Antoni Abad i Ninet, Sustainable Decentralization:Power,
ExtraconstitutionalInfluence, andSubnational Symmetry in the United States and Spain,
59 AM. J.COMp. L. (forthcoming 2011).
19. Williams & Tarr, supra note 9, at 7. See infra text accompanying notes 66-68.
20. Williams & Tarr,supra note 9, at 11.
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constitution. 2 1 The political explanations of this "underutilization thesis"
present a fertile area of research.22
After Dr. Tarr and I developed this interest in comparative
subnational constitutional law, we began to reach out to scholars and
practitioners in other federal countries, realizing that there were a
number of very knowledgeable individuals who were simply not talking
to each other about this topic. We were successful in organizing
conferences or meetings in Pretoria, South Africa,23 Bellagio, Italy,24
Bosen-Bolzano, Italy,25 Athens, Greece,26 and Mexico City,2 7 where we,
with the help of many others, brought together a number of these
knowledgeable individuals to build a basis for this new subcategory of
comparative constitutional law. We formed an organization called the
21. Id. at 14-15; GERARD CARNEY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEMS OF THE
AUSTRALIAN STATES AND TERRITORIES 29 (2006) ("While the States enjoy the capacity to
amend their Constitutions by ordinary legislation, to experiment and to innovate, they
have largely neglected to do this."); Juan Marcos Guti6rrez Gonzilez, United Mexican
States, in 1 GLOBAL DIALOGUE ON FEDERALISM: CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS, STRUCTURE
AND CHANGE IN FEDERAL COUNTRIES 209, 215 (John Kincaid & G. Alan Tarr, eds., 2005)
("Although state constitutions [in Mexico] can create institutions and procedures that are
not regulated by the federal Constitution, they usually deal with matters of minor
importance, such as simple administrative organization and some alternative legal ways
of implementing federal regulations"). See Helen Hershkoff & Stephen Loffredo, State
Courts and ConstitutionalSocio-economic Rights: Exploring the UnderutilizationThesis,
115 PENN ST. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011):
The nascent comparative literature on subnationalism suggests that constitutive
units do not always develop the political space that their constitution-making
authority affords them. Rather, commentators observe that "subnational units
in federal systems more often underutilize their constitution-making
competency than they overutilize it." Some commentators further argue that
because of agency costs, subnational rights may tend to be under-protected or
only weakly entrenched in the sense of being subject to easy amendment,
reversed by popular referendum, or diluted through legislative backlash.
22. Astrid Lorenz & Werner Reutter, Subnational Constitutional Politics in a
Multilayered System: A Comparative Analysis of ConstitutionalPolitics in the German
Lander, paper delivered at the Workshop on Subnational Constitutions of the World
Congress of the International Association of Constitutional Law, Mexico City (Dec. 7,
2010) [hereinafter Workshop].
23. SEMINAR REPORT: SUBNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE (KonradAdenauer-Stiftung 1999).
24. Subnational Constitutions and Federalism: Design & Reform, available at
http://camlaw.rutgers.edu/statecon/subnational 1.html.
25. This conference led to the publication of FEDERALISM, SUBNATIONAL
CONSTITUTIONS, AND MINORITY RIGHTS, supra note 9.

26. The International Association of Constitutional Law VIIth World Congress on
Constitutional Law, Workshop II: Subnational Constitutions in Federal Constitutional
States, June 13, 2007, available at http://camlaw.rutgers.edu/statecon/workshipll
greece07/Williams.pdf
27. The International Association of Constitutional Law Secretariat, World Congress
Workshop 5 'Subnational Constitutions,' Apr. 11, 2010, available at http://www.iaclaidc.org/?p-447. The workshop on subnational constitutions in Mexico City was
extremely interesting and successful and included a number of new, young scholars.
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International Association of Subnational Constitutional Law,28 and the
International Association of Constitutional Law has now recognized our
group as the Research Group on Subnational Constitutions in Federal and
Quasi-Federal Constitutional States.2 9 Dr. Tarr and I coedit a volume of
the International Encyclopaedia of Laws on subnational constitutional
law. 30 Finally, we have utilized the Rutgers Law Journal Annual Issue
On State ConstitutionalLaw, for which I serve as faculty editor, as one
organ to disseminate literature on comparative subnational constitutional
law. 3'
III. INTEREST IN, AND REVISION OF, SUBNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS

In a number of federal countries we have seen a substantial increase
in interest in, and revision of, subnational constitutions. Many of the
Swiss Cantons have revised their subnational constitutions.32 Peter
Bussjdiger reports that in Austria, even with its limited subnational
constitutional space: "[S]ome observers have also noted a 'wider selfconsciousness' among the Lander to make use of the constitutional space
available to them. Coinciding with this was a change in the common
understanding of the role of Ldnder constitutions among legal scholars
and practitioners."3 3
Peter Quint noted that it was a very important step when the five
former East German Linder revised their subnational constitutions at the
time of German reunification: "Even the most modest of these new state
constitutions reflect the lessons of the GDR past and the 1989 revolution,
and-with all their similarities to the Basic Law [national constitution]can still be said to represent a distinctly different, and distinctly eastern
constitutional consciousness." 34 Australia has considered the inclusion

28. International
Association
of
Subnational
Constitutional
Law,
http://camlaw.rutgers.edu/statecon/iascl/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2011).
29. International Association of Constitutional Law, Subnational Constitutions in
Federal and Quasi-Federal Constituional States, http://www.iacl-aidc.org/?p=62 (last
visited Feb. 25, 2011).
30.

INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAWS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBNATIONAL

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW

(1999)

(containing

detailed

monographs

on

subnational

constitutions in South Africa, Australia, Germany, Russia, Argentina, and the United
States with others planned in the future).
31. See e.g. 31 RUTGERS L.J. 937 (2000).
32. Nicholas Schmitt, New Constitutionsfor All Swiss Cantons: A Contemporary
Challenge, in BURGESS & TARR, supra note 4. See also Giovanni Biaggini, Federalism,
Subnational Constitutional Arrangements, and the Protection of Minorities in
Switzerland, in FEDERALISM,

SUBNATIONAL

CONSTITUTIONS,

AND MINORITY RIGHTS,

supra note 9, at 213, 219.

33.

Bussjager, supra note 4.

34.

PETER E. QUINT, IN PERFECT UNION: CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES OF GERMAN

UNIFICATION 99 (1997).
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of a new state, the Northern Territory, with its attendant state
constitutionmaking possibilities.35 Australian comparative constitutional
law expert Cheryl Saunders noted, in 2000, that: "A revival of interest in
state constitutions in Australia would be consistent with developments
elsewhere in the world."36 Even in the Sudan, at least in the Southern
portion, new state constitutions have been adopted in a very important
exercise of subnational constitutionmaking. 37 An important question is
whether component units in federal states should utilize their allotted
subnational constitutional space. 38 Nigeria considered this question in
1977 and decided not even to permit state constitutions to be adopted
there because they might prove too "divisive." 39 John Marshfield has
provided a detailed consideration to the question of the benefits of
permitting subnational constitutions in federal countries, including
accommodation of multiple political communities, providing checks and
balances to protect liberty and improving the deliberative quality of
democracy. 40
A.

SubnationalIdentity Constitutionalism

In some countries the increased interest in the importance of
subnational constitutions has led to the assertion of "subnational identity
constitutionalism," often at the urging of local political parties, where
"formulas like 'nation,' 'nationality,' 'historical nationality,' 'national
identity' or 'historical community' are used, and many provisions are
devoted to the local idioms." 4 1 In Spain, for example, there have been
35. Cheryl Saunders, Australian State Constitutions, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 999, 9991000, 1014-18 (2000).
36. Id. at 1000. For discussion on Australian state constitutions, see Anne Twomey,
Australia Subnational Constitutional Law, in VOL. SUB-NAT'L CONST. L. 1
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAWS 13 (Roger Blanpain et al. eds., 2004).

37. Christina Murray & Catherine Maywald, Subnational Constitution-Making in
Southern Sudan, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 1203 (2006). It remains to be seen what the effect of
the referendum splitting North and South Sudan will have on these state constitutions.
38. On this question in South Africa, see Ralph Lawrence, Where There's Political
Will There Might Be a Way: Subnational Constitutions and the Birth of Democracy in
South Africa, in SEMINAR REPORT, supra note 23, at 87. See also Jonathan L. Marshfield,
Authorizing Subnational Constitutions in Transitional Federal States: South Africa,
Democracy, and the KwaZulu-Natal Constitution, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 585
(2008). On the national political influence on this question in South Africa, see
Williams, supra note 10, at 643.
39. Jonathan Marshfield, Models ofSubnational Constitutionalism,115 PENN. ST. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2011). See also L. Adele Jinadu, The Constitutional Situation of the
Nigerian States, PUBLIUS, Winter 1982, at 155, 163-64.
40. Marshfield, supra note 39.
41. Giacomo Delledonne & Giuseppe Martinico, Legal Conflicts and Subnational
Constitutionalism, 41 RUTGERS L.J. (forthcoming 2011). A number of my students in
Graz noted this phenomenon.
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major adjustments in the "autonomy statutes" (not referred to as
"constitutions") that govern the regional, autonomous communities. 4 2
Similar developments have been taking place with Italy's regional
statutes (Statuti regionali) which, somewhat like those in Spain, are not
called "constitutions," but share a number of the characteristics of
subnational constitutions.4 3 The Italian Constitutional Court has ruled, as
a legal matter, that the regional statuti are not "constitutions" and cannot
have the legal effect of constitutions."
The Spanish Constitutional
Court, in 2010, in a very controversial decision, struck down several
provisions, some of which reflected
"subnational
identity
constitutionalism," of the revised Autonomy Statute of Catalonia.4 5 An
important controversy has been taking place in China over the question
whether the organic statutes for Hong Kong and Macau may properly be
referred to as subnational constitutions.4 6 The High Court in Hong Kong
did, in fact, refer to these as "constitutions," only to be rebuffed by the
Standing Committee of the National Peoples Party and forced to clarify
its position.47 So, the developments in Spain, Italy and China raise the
question as to what really counts as a constitution at the subnational
level, as well as the limits of subnational "constitutional" space.

42. Cdsar Colino, Constitutional Change Without Constitutional Reform: Spanish
Federalism andthe Revision of Catalonia'sStatute ofAutonomy, 39 PUBLIUS 262 (Spring
2009). See also Giuseppe Martinico The New "Estatutos de autonomia" In Spain: A
Brief Overview of the Literature,2:1 PERSPECTIVES ON FEDERALISM R-1 (2010).
43. Giacomo Delledonne & Giuseppe Martinico, Handle with Care! The Regional
Charters and Italian Constitutionalism's"Grey Zone," 5 EUROPEAN CONST. L. REV. 218,
219-22 (2009).
44. Id. at 223. See also Delledonne & Martinico, supra note 41.
45. Delledonne & Martinico, supra note 41. Interestingly, it was other Autonomous
Communities that challenged the provisions of its fellow component unit's "constitution."
Gardner and Abad i Ninet supra note 18. For an analysis of the decision, see Generalitat
de
Catalinya
2006,
Statute
of
Autonomy
of
Catalonia,
http://wwwl0.gencat.cat/drep/AppJava/cat/ambits/recerca/IEAAngles/dev/02eac.jsp (last
visited Feb. 25, 2011).
46. Han Bing, The Basic Laws of HK and Macao SARs Aren't Subnational
Constitutions in China, paper delivered at Workshop on Subnational Constitutions of the
World Congress of the International Association of Constitutional Law, Mexico City
(Dec. 7, 2010).
47. Wang Zhenjun, On the Hierarchy of Constitution and Basic Law in the SARfrom the Perspective ofDecision of Hong Kong's "Ng Ka Ling Case," paper delivered at
the delivered at Workshop on Subnational Constitutions of the World Congress of the
International Association of Constitutional Law, Mexico City (Dec. 7, 2010). See
generally ONE COUNTRY, Two SYSTEMS, THREE LEGAL ORDERS-PERSPECTIVES OF
EVOLUTION: ESSAYS ON MACAU'S AUTONOMY AFTER THE RESUMPTION OF SOVEREIGNTY
BY CHINA (Jorge Oliveira & Paulo Cardinal, eds., 2009). Of course, the German national
"constitution," the Basic Law, has intentionally never been referred to as a "constitution."
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IV. THE LIMITS OF SUBNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS
There are available materials, even just in English, for a study of the
borders or limits of subnational constitutional space in a number of
federal countries, together with initial comparisons with other federal
constitutional systems.
A.

Austria

For example, in Austria the national Constitutional Court had struck
down a provision in the constitution of one of the Ldnder, Vorarlberg,
because the subnational constitution purported to authorize a form of
direct democracy that would require the Land parliament to enact a
statute that it otherwise refused to enact.4 This ruling, purportedly based
on the requirements of the "Homogeneity Principle" of the Austrian
Constitution, 49 was not based on any explicit limit, relied on a judgemade, implied federal constitutional limit on subnational constitutions,
and was the subject of substantial academic criticism.50 This was a
decision that the Austrian students could read for themselves in German,
but also study an analysis and criticism published in English by an
Austrian professor.51 This, of course, also enabled me to discuss the case
which was an example of federal policing of subnational constitutional
space to contain it.
B.

South Africa

There was a similar decision in South Africa, where the South
African Constitutional Court rendered a grudging interpretation of the
already extremely narrow subnational constitutional space granted to the
provinces in the South African Constitution. 12 Despite the fact that the
national constitution permitted the provinces to enact constitutions that
varied the "default" provisions in the national constitution for the
structure of their legislative and executive branches, the Court struck
down a provision in the proposed Western Cape Provincial Constitution
48. Anna Gamper, Homogeneity and Democracy in Austrian Federalism: The
Constitutional Court's Ruling on Direct Democracy in Vorarlberg, PUBLIus, Winter
2003, at 45, 45. In class I asked why Vorarlberg had moved to amend its constitution in
this and other ways while other Lander had not. The class discussion was quite
speculative, but included considerations of party politics and the fact that Vorarlberg
borders Germany, Switzerland and Liechtenstein. As noted, there has been significant
subnational constitutional activity in Germany and Switzerland.
49. Id. at 46-52.
50. Id. at 52-57; Bussjager, supra note 4.
51. Gamper, supra note 48.
52. Ex Parte Speaker of the Western Cape ProvincialLegislature:In re Certification
of the Constitution of the Western Cape, 1997 (9) BCLR at 1167 (S. Afr.).
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that adopted a different electoral system for the provincial legislature.
This decision, like the one in Austria, lead to significant academic
criticism as being too conservative or narrow a federal judicial view of
the constitutional space accorded the component units.53
C.

The UnitedStates

To give a comparative, American example of these issues, one
might refer to the fairly grudging, narrow interpretation of the power of
states to ratify proposed federal constitutional amendments under Article
V of the United States Constitution. The United States Supreme Court,
even in the absence of any explicit limits on state legislatures contained
in Article V, struck down a variety of procedural steps that states inserted
in their constitutions before state legislatures may vote to ratify proposed
federal constitutional amendments.5 4 Of course, the case of Bush v.
Gore55 comes to mind as an example of an implied limit on'state election
mechanisms in Presidential elections, partly based on the fact that the
Florida Supreme Court relied not only on state statutes (from the
legislature) but also alluded to the Florida Constitution. 6 These could be
seen as American examples of the top-down judicial "overenforcement
thesis." Of course, also in the United States, it is common for provisions
in state constitutions to be struck down because they have more clearly
"exceeded their subnational constitutional space," or in American
constitutional terms, because they violate federal law.57
Cases such as those described in Italy, Spain, Austria, South Africa,
and China, as well as those in Mexico and the United States, may begin
to form the basis for a top-down, judicial "overenforcement thesis,"

53.

Dirk Brand, The Western Cape Provincial Constitution, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 961,

966-67 (2000). See also Williams, supra note 10, at 654-59; Rassie Malherbe & Dirk
Brand, South Africa Sub-national Constitutional Law, in VOL. SUB-NAT'L CONST. L. 1
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAWS 98-100 (Roger Blanpain et al. eds., 2001).
54. Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920); Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922).
Several more recent federal court decisions concerned the defeat of the federal Equal
Rights Amendment in Florida and Illinois. See Trombetta v. Florida, 353 F. Supp. 575
(M.D. Fla. 1973); Dyer v. Blair, 390 F. Supp. 1291 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
55. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
56. See James A. Gardner, The Regulatory Role of State Constitutional Structural
Constraints in PresidentialElections, 29 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 625 (2001); Robert A.
Schapiro, Conceptions and Misconceptions of State ConstitutionalLaw in Bush v. Gore,
29 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 661 (2001).
57. See, e.g. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S.
369 (1967); Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985); Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512
U.S. 415 (1994); Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000).
58. See supra text accompanying note 54. For Mexican examples, see Hector FixFierro, Judicial Reform and the Supreme Court of Mexico: The Trajectory of Three
Years, 6 U.S.-MEX. L.J. 1, 10-12 (1998).
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where national judicial or other review results in an unnecessarily narrow
and grudging view of subnational constitutional space. This may be
identity
"subnational
to
respect
with
true
particularly
59 where largely symbolic provisions are struck down.
constitutionalism,"
Interestingly, in an important new book Yonathan Fessha argues that
such expressions of subnational constitutional identity are very important
to a healthy and effective federal system.60
South Africa

D.

Despite national constitutional authorization, albeit narrow, only
two of South Africa's nine provinces have engaged in subnational
constitutionmaking: Western Cape and KwaZulu/Natal. KwaZulu/Natal
submitted a provincial constitution that was struck down by the
Constitutional Court because it far exceeded the allocated subnational
constitutional space.6 1 Interestingly, however, in the course of these
decisions by the South African Constitutional Court, it expressed the
view that it would be proper for a Province to include a bill of rights,
even providing rights beyond (but not in conflict with) the national
constitution, in its provincial constitution.6 2 This is not explicitly
authorized. So, just as there may be implied limits on subnational
constitutional space, as illustrated by the Austrian and earlier South
59.

Delledonne & Martinico, supra note 41.

60. YONATHAN FESSHA, ETHNIC DIVERSITY
MAKING IN SOUTH AFRICA AND ETHIOPIA 3 (2010):

AND

FEDERALISM:

CONSTITUTION

The book contends that a multi-ethnic state must somehow recognize the ethnic
plurality that characterizes its society. It presents recognition of ethnic
diversity as an important institutional principle of a state that seeks to respond
to the challenges of ethnic diversity. It advances this argument based on two
points. First, an empirical examination of the experiences of multi-ethnic states
suggest that states that are predicated on suppressing ethnic diversity have not
succeeded in achieving their goal of creating a common national identity. In
fact, the empirical evidence suggests that most of these countries are plagued
by ethnic-based conflicts. Second, a state cannot remain neutral in so far as
ethnic relationships are concerned, although this, admittedly, is the best
strategy to build a state that does not create a hierarchical relationship among
the different ethnic groups. The upshot of this argument is that the state has no
choice but to recognize its multi-ethnic character.
61. Certification of the Constitution of the Province of KwaZulu-Natal, 1996 (Case
CCT 15/96, September 6, 1996); Williams, supra note 10, at 648-54; Marshfield, supra
note 38, at 613-20.
62. Williams, supra note 10, at 650-51. The Court also ruled that several other, less
important matters could be included in provincial constitutions even though not
specifically authorized. Delledonne & Martinico, supra note 43, at 222-24. In Italy, by
contrast, the Constitutional Court ruled that the regional charters could not contain
Id. Stopping short of declaring such provisions
enforceable rights guarantees.
unconstitutional, the Court "rescued," or kept them "alive" by creating a middle ground
of "cultural statements." Id.
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African examples, there may also be implied competence beyond the
space explicitly created in the national constitution. To what extent is
this true in other federal systems? 63
So, even with the slowly-emerging materials that we have available,
it is possible to teach effectively the role of legal limits, and lawyers' and
academics' argumentation with respect thereto, concerning the federal
policing of the borders of the space allocated to component or
subnational units to enact constitutions. One additional point, noted
earlier, about federal policing of the legal contours of subnational
constitutional space should be made: process as well as substance may
be involved. Therefore, in South Africa the national constitution permits
provincial (subnational) constitutions to be made only by the provincial
parliament, with a two-thirds majority vote of the elected members.
When the Province of KwaZulu/Natal purported to adopt a constitution
that permitted further constitutional material to be adopted at a later point
in time, by statute, the Constitutional Court noted this as one of the
grounds for refusing to certify the Provincial constitution. 64
V.

INTRUDING ON SUBNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL SPACE

As noted, it is not only possible for subnational constitutions to
exceed their allotted space, but the opposite is also true. The national
authorities may intrude into protected subnational constitutional space
and the legal policing mechanisms must operate here as well. In the
words of the Ronald Watts, a leading scholar of federalism:
Federations have varied enormously in the range of powers assigned
to each order of government, but common to them all is the
constitutional guarantee to the subnational governments of
noncentralization, i.e., autonomy, in at least some fields of

jurisdiction.
Another South African example provides an important lesson. The
very narrow subnational constitutional space allocated to the provinces in
the South African Constitution permits ("guarantees") them to vary the
legislative or executive "structures" provided in the national constitution.
The Western Cape Province's constitution specified that the provincial
legislature would be composed of forty-two members, but the national
election authorities, relying on their federal authority, determined that the
63. In Mexico the Constitution of the state of Oaxaca provided protection for
indigenous peoples before the federal Constitution. Gonzdlez, supra note 21, at 214.
64. Williams supra note 10, at 657.
65. Ronald L. Watts, Foreword: States, Provinces, Lander, and Cantons:
International Variety Among Subnational Constitutions, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 941, 949
(2000).
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Western Cape Provincial Parliament should have thirty-nine seats. When
this dispute could not be resolved, the Constitutional Court had to step in
and protect the Western Cape's utilization of its narrow, albeit legitimate,
subnational constitutionmaking space.66 In fact, the Constitutional Court
had rejected a similar challenge several years earlier when it ruled on the
validity of the proposed Western Cape provincial constitution.6 An
interesting inquiry would be to evaluate the extent that judicial or other
protection of subnational constitutional space takes place in other federal
systems and the types of argument that are made.
Dr. John Dinan, already an expert on American comparative state
constitutional law, 6 8 has embarked on an important comparative study of
subnational constitutions in federal countries. 6 9 His study is aimed
particularly at the extent to which subnational constitutional structures
differ (political decisions about the use of subnational constitutional
space) from those of the national constitution of the country. Dinan
found that federal countries did not show variance between national and
subnational constitutions with respect to presidentialism or
parliamentarism. On this issue, subnational constitutions almost always
mirror the national constitution. He continued:
However, in three other areas, subnational constitution-makers have
departed from their national counterparts in important and patterned
ways that suggest distinctive traits of subnational constitutionalism.
Although all but a few federations have bicameral national
legislatures, unicameralism is increasingly the norm in subnational
constitutions. Subnational constitutions are invariably easier to
amend than their national counterparts. Subnational constitutions
also generally provide more opportunities for direct democracy. 70
Another comparative approach, of course, would be to see how the
subnational constitutions within a country compare to each other, or to
evaluate how subnational constitutions within one federal country
compare to those in another federal country or countries. Comparative
subnational constitutional law research obviously could be expanded to
cover many other questions such as whether subnational constitutions
provide, or are interpreted to provide, rights guarantees beyond national
C61ine Fercot has provided an interesting
minimum standards.
introduction to such analysis, comparing Germany, Switzerland and the
66.
BCLR
67.
68.
69.

Premiere of the Province of the Western Cape v. Electorial Comm'n., 1999 (11)
1209 (CC) (S. Afr.).
Brand, supra note 53, at 967-68.
JoHN DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION (2006).
John Dinan, Patterns of Subnational Constitutionalismin Federal Countries, 39

RUTGERS L.J. 837 (2009).
70. Id. at 841. For Australia, see TWOMEY, supra note 11, at 801-02.
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United States.n
This area of subnational constitutional rights protection beyond the
national minimum constitutional guarantees is potentially very
important.72 As noted earlier, the South African Constitutional Court has
ruled that South African provincial constitutions may contain rights
guarantees beyond those in the national constitution.73 There is at least
one example of a judicial ruling in Germany, by a Land constitutional
court, interpreting language in the Land constitution to be more
protective than similar language in the national Basic Law as interpreted
by the Constitutional Court.74 Several of the new state constitutions in
Southern Sudan contain womens' rights provisions that do not appear in
the national constitution. This is an important area for both subnational
constitutional textual innovation and evolution as well as judicial
interpretation. As John Kincaid observed:
The new judicial federalism, however, suggests a model that would
enable rights advocates to continue pressing for vigorous national and
even international rights protections, while also embedding in
regional constitutions and local charters rights that cannot be
embedded in the national constitution, effectively enforced by the
national government, or enforced only at minimal levels. Such an
arrangement would produce peaks and valleys of rights protection
within a nation, but this rugged rights terrain is surely preferable to a
flat land of minimal or ineffectual national rights protection. The
peak jurisdictions can function, under democratic conditions, as
rights leaders for a leveling-up process. In an emerging democracy
culturally hostile to women's rights, for example, such an
arrangement could embolden at least one subnational jurisdiction to
institutionalize women's rights, thus establishing a rights peak visible
to the entire society without plunging the nation into civil war or back
into reactionary authoritarianism.

71. C6line Fercot, Diversity of Constitutional Rights in Federal Systems: A
ComparativeAnalysis of German, American and Swiss Law, 4 EUROPEAN CONST. L. REv.
302 (2008).
72. Williams and Tarr, supra note 9, at 15-16. This is, of course, one of the primary
features of state constitutional law in the United States. See generally WILLIAMS,
AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 7, at 111-232.
73. Premiere of the Province of the Western Cape v. Electorial Comm'n., 1999 (11)
BCLR 1209 (CC) (S. Afr.).
74. Jdrn Ipsen, Relations Between Subnational and Local Governments Structured
by SubnationalConstitutions, in SEMINAR REPORT, supra note 23, at 59, 64.

75. Murray and Maywald, supra note 37, at 1224-25.
76. In Germany, the 1947 constitution of the Free Hanseatic City of Bremen
outlawed lockouts even though the Basic Law did not. Delledonne & Martinico, supra

note 41.
77.

John Kincaid, Foreword: The New Federalism Context of The New Judicial
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VI. USING SUBNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS AS POLICYMAKING TOOLS
TO SUPPLEMENT OR SUPPLANT ORDINARY LAWMAKING

Another interesting area of inquiry might evaluate the extent to
which subnational constitutions are utilized, as in the United States, as
tools or instruments of policymaking to supplement, or supplant,
ordinary lawmaking.7 8 For example, after Mexico's Supreme Court
upheld Mexico City's statute legalizing first-trimester abortion, many of
the state constitutions in Mexico are being amended to ban abortion
altogether. As one journalist observed:
But three months after the Supreme Court upheld Mexico City's law,
the state of Morelos amended its own constitution to decree that life
begins at conception, granting embryos the same rights and
protections as the mothers who carry them. Within a year, 14 more
of Mexico's 31 states had passed similar amendments. (Three more
are expected to join them soon.) Some of the amendments even
outlaw the IUD, a popular birth control method. 79
In contrast, in Argentina the constitution of Buenas Aires (a capital
autonomous region) was amended to protect same sex marriage. Of
course, many American states amended their constitutions to ban samesex marriage, including California's Proposition 8 which overturned the
California Supreme Court's decision that a ban on same-sex marriage
violated the California Constitution's equality provision.80 John Dinan
analyzes this use of state constitutional amendments to attain policies
that cannot be achieved at the federal level." To what extent have such
processes been taking place in other federal countries?
VII. CONCLUSION
Comparative subnational constitutional research is now covering
both theoretical aspectS82 as well as practical lessons from subnational
Federalism,26 RUTGERS L.J. 913, 946-47 (1995).
78. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 7, at 21-25.
79. Mary Cuddehe, Mexico's Abortion Wars, THE ATLANTIC, Oct. 29, 2009. See
also Ken Ellingwood, Antiabortion Forces are Sweeping Mexico, PHIL. INQUIRER, Jan.
10, 2010, at A24.
80. See, e.g. Vikram David Amar, California Constitutional Conundrums-State
Constitutional Quirks Exposed by the Same-Sex MarriageExperience, 40 RUTGERS L.J.
741 (2009).
81. John Dinan, Subnational Constitutional Amendment Processes and the
Safeguards of Federalism: The U.S. in Comparative Context, 115 PENN. ST. L. REv.
(forthcoming 2011).
82. Tom Ginsberg and Eric A. Posner, Subconstitutionalism,62 STAN. L. REv. 1583
(2010); Marshfield, supra note 39; G. Alan Tarr, Explaining Subnational Constitutional
Space, 115 PENN. ST. L. REv. (forthcoming 2011); James A. Gardner, In Search of SubNational Constitutionalism,4 EUROPEAN CONST. REv. 325 (2008); Robert A. Schapiro,
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It still seems clear, however,

that the "Renaissance" of comparative constitutional law 84 has not
included much of a focus on subnational constitutions. Subnational
constitutional law, however, is here to stay despite globalization85 and
skepticism about its ability to foster genuine "subnational
constitutionalism."8 6 Still, there have been enough developments in the
subfield so that we no longer have to endure what John Henry Merryman
called the "Loneliness of the Comparative Lawyer." 8 7 These brief ideas

Foreword: In the Twilight of The Nation-State: Subnational Constitutions in the New
World Order,39 RUTGERS L.J. 801 (2008).
83. Anne Twomey, Dangerous Democracy: Citizens' Initiated Referenda in
California, 21 PUBLIC L. REv. 70 (2010) (reviewing direct democracy in California for
Alan Tarr's important book, UNDERSTANDING STATE
Australian audience).
CONSTITUTIONS has now been translated into Spanish by Daniel A. Barcel6 Rojas.
COMPRENDIENDO LAS CONSTITUCIONES ESTATALES (Daniel A. Barcel6 trans., 2009). See
also Vicki Jackson, Constitutional Dialogue and Human Dignity: States and
TransnationalConstitutionalDiscourse,65 MONT. L. REV. 15 (2004).
84. A.E. Dick Howard, A Travelerfrom an Antique Land: The Modern Renaissance
of ComparativeConstitutionalism, 50 VA. J.INT'L L. 3 (2009).
85. Schapiro, supra note 82, at 804, 834-35:
Nation-states are losing their monopoly on international influence, but some
need for a framework continues. States and state constitutions are well
positioned to fill that gap. States can provide a mediating structure to allow a
variety of subnational bodies to participate in governance with less danger of
conflict and confusion. States and state constitutions also offer a mechanism to
provide political legitimacy within a post-Westphalian regime. As compared
with the national political system, the state governmental process provides a
means to incorporate international law that is more accountable to the
electorate and more likely to ensure the appropriate adaptation of global norms
within the domestic system. In this way, states can make the globalizing
process more democratic and more authentic.
Globalization has led to a proliferation of intersecting legal institutions, thus
heightening the need for conceptions of legitimacy and for coordinating
structures.
States and state constitutions have a central role in this project of
legitimation and coordination. States always have existed in a liminal space,
mediating between the national government and the localities. Moreover, states
long have functioned as non-Westphalian sovereigns. They are not nationstates, but polities that act within a complex web of legal institutions. Their
legitimacy comes not from their identification with the "people" of the state,
but through adhering to certain transparent processes and providing numerous
means of democratic accountability. States are well suited to provide key
nodes of power in the new world order, and an understanding of their role will
be critical to responding to the challenges that globalization poses.
86. Gardner, supra note 82. Gardner notes that in countries other than the United
States factors such as much easier access to constitutional change at the national level, as
well as the advent of supranational institutions for rights protection, may actually result in
declining importance for subnational constitutions.
87. JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE LONELINESS OF THE COMPARATIVE LAWYER, AND
OTHER ESSAYS INFOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE LAW (1999).
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illustrate, I believe, the potential for studying subnational constitutions
and introducing the topic to law and political science research and
teaching here and abroad. I hope that these few examples will stimulate
further investigation of this important new and real component of
comparative constitutional law.
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